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0 EDITORS' PREFACE 0
As scientific endeavors increasingly become a part of the mod-
ern tradition, the question of the law's response to science has often
been raised. The response of science to the law, however, raises the
further question of whether scientific methods can provide helpful
insight into the judicial process. In his lead article for the third is-
sue of Volume 21, Ovid C. Lewis examines whether there can be a
scientific explanation of judicial behavior.
Realizing that technique may be more important than sub-
stance, Professor Lewis first attempts to select the appropriate
method with which to begin the inquiry. He concludes that the
"systems approach" is superior to other existing alternatives because
it removes a multitude of constraints which have heretofore beset
behavioralists in their endeavor. Examining the basic tenets of the
systems approach and recognizing that there is an array of systems,
the author sets out to identify the characteristics of the system most
common to man - the complex adaptive system. Because complex
adaptive systems function at varying levels, he chooses to examine
in detail the personality system - "the level most significant for
analyzing judicial behavior." Adopting Gordon Allport's theory
of personality, Professor Lewis identifies a host of imponder-
ables, all of which require answers if man is ever to understand the
behavior of other men.
Merely identifying some of the variables central to understand-
ing human behavior, however, is not sufficient to permit the be-
havioralist to begin his analysis of judicial behavior. If the objec-
tive is to obtain a scientific explanation of judicial behavior, the
systems approach dictates that the behavioralist ask whether his
tools of analysis are adequate for scientifically explaining human
behavior. Comparing the scientific endeavor to the behavioralist
enterprise from the perspective of seven significant parameters, the
author illustrates the difficulties which confront the behavioralist
"who aspires to commit science on a judge." Although there are
a number of techniques which provide the behavioralist with useful
insights into judicial behavior, Professor Lewis suggests that such
techniques are far from "scientific."
The final segment of the article presents a case study of a be-
havioralist attempting to explain scientifically the behavior of a
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judge deciding a case. Applying the systems approach to illustrate
the problems raised in earlier portions of the article, the author
concludes that although there is apparent utility in the approach,
much remains to be done in developing reliable methods and tech-
niques capable of providing scientific insight into the judicial proc-
ess.
The second lead article in issue three, written by Leon Gabinet,
is entitled, "The Interest Deduction: Several New Installments in a
Continuing Saga." Examining recent developments as they relate
to the interest provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, Professor
Gabinet centers his analysis on Revenue Ruling 68-643 and the
newly enacted interest provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
In Revenue Ruling 68-643, the Commissioner determined that,
in order to clearly reflect income, a prepayment of interest should
not be deductible currently. Analyzing the existing case law in the
area prior to the ruling, the author not only concludes that the rul-
ing is inconsistent with traditional judicial standards applied in
interest prepayment cases, but that the rationale under which the
ruling was promulgated, as well as extrinsic arguments that have
later been raised in its defense, provide little support for the Com-
missioner's position. Thus, he urges that a return to traditional
judicial methods of resolving such questions is preferable.
Examining the interest provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, the author notes the emergence of three new Code sections.
The first such provision is seemingly intended to discourage the
borrowing of funds to purchase non-income-producing property,
since such borrowing gives the taxpayer a current deduction with
which to shelter ordinary income. Professor Gabinet concludes,
however, that the statute is drafted in such a manner as "to pro-
vide a safe harbor for all but the most ambitious of borrowers."
Likewise, examining the new debt-equity provisions of the Reform
Act as they relate to the interest deduction, he concludes that it is
questionable whether they offer a better approach to the resolution
of existing problems. Finally, Professor Gabinet discusses the pro-
visions of the Reform Act which place a limitation on the interest
deduction in corporate acquisitions. Discerning the existence of a
nontax policy objective, he adopts the position that purely tax policy
objectives suggest that disallowance of the interest deduction in this
context is not justified.
